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Key Points
·  Foundation strategy is hampered by a failure to 
recognize and engage with the complexity and 
uncertainty surrounding foundation work. This 
article identifies three common “traps” that hinder 
foundation capacity to learn and adapt: 1) linearity 
and certainty bias; 2) the autopilot effect; and 3) 
indicator blindness. 
·  This article urges foundations to alter their mind-
set, questions, and processes to foster a more 
committed approach to strategy and adaptation. 
In essence, it argues for learning as strategy.
· This article draws on literature from systems 
theory, business strategy, and philanthropic prac-
tice as well as data from foundation benchmarking 
surveys.
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With the emergence of strategic philanthropy, 
foundations have altered in significant ways how 
they work. They have moved from a responsive 
relationship with their grantee communities to 
a position that assumes more responsibility for 
identifying and framing problems, as well as for 
designing strategies to address them. An impor-
tant assumption behind the adoption of this role 
in philanthropy is that foundations can use their 
position and resources to be good at strategy. 
But to be good at strategy, foundations need to 
be good at learning. However, foundations have 
not cracked the nut of how to learn about, adapt, 
and improve strategy in ways commensurate with 
their potential to meet their strategic aims. 
While learning is important for strategic success 
in most circumstances, it becomes essential when 
foundations engage in the complex environments 
characterizing much of what they support under 
the mantle of strategic philanthropy. In fact, in 
these circumstances, learning is strategy.
Through this work, foundations engage in many 
large and extraordinarily difficult and complex 
concerns: improving food security in Africa; 
addressing global warming, poverty, or issues 
of equity in difficult urban settings; transform-
ing social-service delivery systems or creating 
new and far more integrated systems. Some of 
these foundations have attempted to be compre-
hensive in their strategic approach, hoping to 
address root causes of deeply entrenched social 
problems; some have organized communities 
to take up common cause for greater “collective 
impact;” others believe that they can bring about 
the greatest impact by infusing large sums of 
resources toward a problem in a targeted manner, 
thereby stimulating whole systems to respond. 
Each scenario has no certain or widely accepted 
solution, but common to all of these efforts is the 
expectation that foundation work can bring about 
large-scale social impact. 
Yet in the face of the often mind-boggling com-
plexity of this work, foundations have tended to 
remain above the fray, particularly as strategies 
unfold – distanced from what some have called 
the “mess” of social change (Schall, 1994; Schon, 
1973). This distance has raised questions from 
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both philanthropists and observers about whether 
foundations have a role in strategy at all (Buffet, 
2013; Stannard-Stockton, 2009). These and other 
critics question whether foundations are close 
enough to the actual work on the ground to make 
decisions wise enough to guide strategy effectively 
(Patrizi & Thompson, 2011; Martin, 2012).
As leaders of the Evaluation Roundtable, we 
have observed and participated in foundation 
struggles to be better at learning, particularly as 
it relates to strategy.  Through our benchmarking 
work with the Evaluation Roundtable (Evalua-
tion Roundtable & Patrizi Associates, 2010), our 
former jobs in foundations, and our opportunities 
to consult with foundations, we have witnessed 
much change in how foundations approach learn-
ing – but also persistent barriers to their capacity 
to do so.
We have seen the role of evaluation expand 
considerably over the last 10 years, in part corre-
sponding to the growth of strategic philanthropy. 
Foundations now pursue many avenues to collect 
and present information about their strategies 
and to report progress to their boards. Recent 
benchmarking data suggest that foundations ap-
ply evaluation throughout the strategy life cycle 
at least at acceptable levels (Center for Evaluation 
Innovation, 2013). However, deep frustrations 
persist about what foundations know about their 
strategies. One study found a majority of founda-
tion chief executive officers as having identified  
obtaining “meaningful insights” from evaluation 
as a challenge (Buteau & Buchanan, 2011, p. 9). In 
another, foundation trustees said that among vari-
ous aspects of foundation governance, they were 
least satisfied with the information they received 
to assess the foundation’s progress against its 
strategy (Buchanan, Buteau, DiTroia, & Hayman, 
2005). 
In the most recent Evaluation Roundtable Bench-
marking Survey, one quarter of evaluation staff 
reported that their foundations are doing a poor 
job of using evaluative information in midcourse 
decisions and to make summative judgments 
about program or initiative performance (Center 
for Evaluation Innovation, 2013). They also point-
ed to dissatisfaction about “the extent to which 
foundations use evaluation data to understand 
how complex strategies ‘unfold on the ground’” 
(Coffman, Beer, Patrizi, & Thompson, 2013, p. 
46). Although more data than ever are available 
to foundation strategists, we heard persistent 
concerns about how this information actually gets 
used to inform strategy. As one practitioner said, 
“We have lots of data, but it is challenging to get it 
into the work of the strategy team.”   
We take the position in this article that founda-
tions have important but unrealized potential to 
contribute value to strategy by capitalizing upon 
their capacities to build, support, and engage 
in learning. Their location in the landscape of 
social-change agents affords them a rare line of 
vision to see patterns and to work across bound-
aries of organizations, systems, and peoples. They 
have the resources to import both experience 
(from doers) and expertise (from researchers and 
experts). They can afford to experiment and try 
multiple solutions. And if disciplined about their 
own commitments and biases, they can work to 
counteract the kind of blind spots and confirma-
tory tendencies that frequently undermine or-
ganizational capacity to learn (Kahneman, 2011; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Foundations have faltered, however, in maxi-
mizing this potential. They have downplayed 
the complexity of their work and in many cases 
Characteristics of Complex Situations
•	 High	uncertainty	about	how	to	produce	desired	
results	and	great	disagreement	among	diverse	
stakeholders	about	the	nature	of	the	problem	
and	what,	if	anything,	to	do	
•	 Results	that	are	highly	dependent	on	initial	
conditions
•	 Nonlinear	interactions	within	a	dynamic	system
•	 No	right	answers
•	 Key	variables	and	their	interactions	unknown	in	
advance		
•	 Each	situation	is	unique
Michael Patton: Developmental Evaluation
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ignored the uncertainties surrounding their 
strategic enterprises. This article explores what 
we see as a series of self-created “traps” that 
hamper foundations in advancing the kind of 
robust learning needed to guide strategy in these 
complex environments. Drawing on a deep body 
of work on action research (Lewin, 1946; Schon, 
1973, 1983; Argyris, 1982, 1993; Reason, 2006, 
2007) and our own experience working in and 
with foundations, we propose a framework to as-
sist foundations to avoid these traps and advance 
a practice of learning strong enough to validate 
their adopted role as strategists. 
The three traps are:
•	 linearity and certainty bias, which occurs when 
foundations frame their strategies as a set of 
linear, causal, and certain actions and fail to 
address the complexity surrounding the issues 
and systems they hope to change; 
•	 the autopilot effect, which occurs when founda-
tions distance themselves from strategy as it 
unfolds, thereby failing to learn from imple-
mentation; and 
•	 indicator blindness, which occurs when 
foundations track and monitor their strategies 
through performance indicators that reinforce 
the linear, causal, and often-unchecked as-
sumptions built into the work. 
 
When caught in these traps, foundations ap-
proach strategy in ways that minimize and ulti-
mately trivialize the amount of uncertainty they 
face in their theories of change, in the questions 
they ask of their strategies, in the information 
they collect, and in how they assess their strate-
gies.
Strategy and all that follows, such as mid-course 
reviews and measurement, are often operation-
alized as bureaucratic artifacts and processes. 
Strategy comes to be understood as a relatively 
predictable set of actions, sometimes even serving 
as a “blueprint.” Targets are assumed to be real-
ized as planned (milestones), and performance is 
monitored accordingly. 
An alternative mindset and approach are needed. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, foundations 
need to acknowledge what they do not know and 
cannot control and commit to learning their way 
to better strategy. This is no small matter. It puts 
the value of strategic philanthropy in question: To 
be good strategists in these settings, foundations 
need to become good learners and to position 
learning itself as a core strategy. If foundations are 
to meet the challenge of strategic philanthropy, 
they must guard against these traps and enter into 
the complexity and uncertainty of their work with 
their eyes wide open.
Strategy Trap 1: Linearity and Certainty Bias
Foundation strategy development took a leap 
forward in the late 1990s with the development 
of the theory-of-change approach (TOC) (Weiss, 
1995). As designed, its purpose was to foster 
better understanding of comprehensive commu-
nity change initiatives. These community change 
efforts are characteristic of the type of work that 
foundations pursue through their strategies (e.g. 
collective impact, system change), both then and 
now. The TOC approach was intended to help 
communities and foundation strategists articulate 
their theories about how change in their complex 
environments occurs and, more important, to 
remind them that, at best, they had working theo-
ries about change and not tried-and-true recipes. 
The TOC approach sought to 1) expand and 
foster recognition of the deep interconnectedness 
among system elements, actors, and interven-
tions; and 2) shed light on the underlying assump-
tions of the TOC and the uncertainties associated 
with them. 
By introducing “assumptions” into strategic 
thinking, the TOC was developed as a tool to 
drive home the point that strategy in complex 
settings is a highly conditional proposition. For 
instance, many foundations “assume” that there 
will be a ready demand for the supply of whatever 
a strategy might produce – models, knowledge, 
data, or collaboration; through the articulation 
of “assumptions,” the TOC would allow exami-
nation of the barriers to adoption and thereby 
encourage consideration of how a strategy should 
address these barriers. Strategies are populated 
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by complex actors with minds of their own who 
interact with one another as well as participate 
in other “strategies,” thereby producing complex 
and unpredictable interactions and effects. (See 
Box 1.) Rather than serving as a "blueprint for ac-
tion," the TOC approach was designed to increase 
awareness of the system of actors, conditions, 
and dynamics – both at the outset and ongoing. 
Doing so was to provide the focus and drive for 
better questions, knowledge development, learn-
ing, and strategy-course correction.
As practiced, however, the TOC approach fre-
quently has not met these aims. Although founda-
tions may go through theory-of-change exercises 
as they develop their strategies, the resulting 
products rarely are seen as the living documents 
they were intended to be. Worse yet, as many 
of these documents mask both the complexity 
and uncertainty of the undertaking, they may 
undermine or even nullify the perceived need 
for ongoing learning. Even when complexity and 
uncertainty are acknowledged, they tend to be 
downplayed as strategy discussions move higher 
up the foundation ladder from program staff to 
management and, ultimately, to boards. 
The typical foundation strategy document takes 
the form of a table organized into columns pre-
senting lists of recommended interventions or ac-
tions, outputs, outcomes, and impact (broader so-
cietal change expected). Connections are depicted 
by arrows between the columns, and the table is 
often accompanied by a set of performance indi-
cators aligned with the outputs and outcomes. 
The illustration of strategy in this manner, while 
easing communications, obscures a great deal of 
important information as it tends to downplay 
assumptions and, in particular, creates the illusion 
that the work is simple and certain and can be 
understood in simple and certain terms.   
The linearity depicted between what the founda-
tion will support and the anticipated outcomes 
can be strikingly misleading:
•	 Nearly all of these documents filter out any 
indication of serious challenges or factors that 
might impinge upon foundation aims. Yet his-
tory tells us that such factors will greatly shape 
whether or not progress toward outcomes and 
impact can be or is being made. More consid-
eration of who wins and who loses in strategy is 
warranted.   
•	 Few documents offer serious examination 
of the major assumptions behind how larger 
impact will occur, and when they do, they tend 
to be underdeveloped. Assumptions proliferate 
regarding how foundation-supported “leaders” 
or “research” will “amplify” or “multiply” the ef-
fects of their interventions into broader impact, 
BOX 1	
The Dynamics of Complex Social Programs (Pawson, Wong, & Owen, 2011)
•	 Programs	are	active,	not	passive.	Interventions	do	not	work	in	and	of	themselves;	they	only	have	an		
effect	through	the	reasoning	and	reactions	of	their	recipients.
•	 Programs	have	long	implementation	chains	and	multiple	stakeholders.	Recipients	are	many	and	varied;	
reactions	to	programs	thus	differ;	outcomes	are	thus	generally	mixed.
•	 Programs	are	embedded	in	complex	social	systems.	Recipients	are	rooted	in	different	localities,	institu-
tions,	cultures,	and	histories,	all	of	which	shape	the	fortunes	of	a	program.
•	 Programs	are	implemented	amid	the	turbulence	of	other	interventions.	The	policy	agenda	is	delivered	
through	a	multitude	of	interventions,	each	one	interfering	with	the	reception	of	another.
•	 Programs	beg,	steal,	borrow,	and	adapt.	Practitioners	work	constantly	to	improve	the	delivery	of	interven-
tions	rather	than	preserving	uniformity	to	meet	evaluation	and	trial	requirements.
•	 Programs	are	the	offspring	of	previous	interventions.	Social	problems	are	long-standing;	interventions	
evolve	to	try	to	combat	them;	the	success	of	a	current	scheme	depends	on	its	history.
•	 Programs	change	the	conditions	that	make	them	work	in	the	first	place.	An	intervention’s	success	is	
always	time	limited	since	alleviating	a	problem	always	involves	changing	its	concomitant	causes.
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without articulating how this will realistically 
happen. Other assumptions often come in the 
form of “greater knowledge will lead to better 
decisions” or “demonstration of new ways of 
working will lead others to follow.” Yet how 
this expected leverage will actually occur, while 
central to strategy success, often goes unar-
ticulated and therefore, not addressed in the 
strategy.  
•	 The context surrounding a strategy is rarely 
treated as being dynamic or of consequence. 
Issues of context might concern the adequacy 
of the workforce to carry out the strategy 
or other contextual issues related to system 
specific elements. For example, traditional 
academic disciplines have a stronghold on 
how professors are promoted, thereby limiting 
the capacity of new lines of research to take 
hold; community-service providers and school 
systems may not cooperate in the “systems” 
proposed by foundations because they report 
to and are funded by different authorities, even 
though they may serve and hold similar goals 
for the same population. Local circumstances 
can produce local variations that need to be 
considered in strategy. Unfortunately, many of 
these factors often are ignored until undesir-
able results emerge. Then “issues of context” are 
introduced post hoc as plausible explanations 
for what went wrong. 
•	 Few foundation strategy documents address 
how a strategy will incorporate new informa-
tion so that it can be adapted during implemen-
tation. In other words, few strategies articulate 
the questions that should arise from recognized 
uncertainties, which in turn would provide the 
impetus to learn more as the strategy unfolds.  
 
This tendency to oversimplify strategy from the 
start and throughout is inconsistent with indis-
putably high levels of complexity found in foun-
dation efforts to foster social change. Few would 
argue that much of strategic philanthropy is any-
thing but long term, uncertain, and nonlinear, but 
as strategy ambitions have risen in foundations, 
so too has the drive to portray strategy as simple, 
certain, and under control. A recent interview 
with a director of a large grantmaking program 
shed some light on why. Responding to an obser-
vation that his theory of change was fraught with 
many unstated assumptions, particularly in light 
of the highly ambitious nature of his goals, the 
director said that his manager told him, “These 
assumptions are fine, but get rid of them before 
it goes to the president and the board – this will 
never do; it is too messy.”  
The core of the problem may reside high up in 
foundations. Boards send strong signals to staff 
about their expectations for managing complex-
ity when they assert, “If you know what you are 
doing, you can say it easily and succinctly.” When 
boards request that all reporting on strategy be 
limited to red-, yellow-, and green-light indica-
tions of stop, caution, and go, they encourage 
obfuscation of complexity. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that interviews with foundation staff 
suggest that foundation CEOs struggle to find 
“the silver data bullet” that will assure the board 
of progress.
Likewise, the well-intentioned effort to increase 
foundation transparency by making foundation 
theories of change public as a communications 
tool has pushed theories toward simple draw-
ings and “elevator speeches.” The relatively recent 
increase in the call for an elevator speech is often 
tied to strategy clarity; clarity is tied to simplicity; 
simplicity to certainty; and certainty to the veneer 
of competence. 
Few would argue that much of 
strategic philanthropy is anything 
but long term, uncertain, and 
nonlinear, but as strategy ambitions 
have risen in foundations, so too 
has the drive to portray strategy as 
simple, certain, and under control.
Learning as Strategy
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Strategy Trap 2: The Autopilot Effect 
Foundation attention to learning from strategy 
implementation has been a persistent problem 
over the years we have benchmarked foundation 
strategy and evaluation efforts. While foundations 
often point to the pressures of “payout” as an 
explanation for the low level of attention strategy 
implementation receives, we posit that a kind of 
benign “unknowing” is at play. This may allow 
foundations to make major commitments while 
keeping themselves insulated from actualities 
surrounding their strategies that, if fully detailed, 
might halt any decision. This very well may be 
human nature or what Hirschman (1961) has 
called the “hiding hand,” which allows decision 
makers to take risks without being immobilized 
by feelings that they need to know everything 
prior to taking action. Therefore, the challenge for 
any strategist is to be able to distinguish between 
what is acceptable and unacceptable risk and what 
kind of knowledge is associated with either.
One response might be that program staff need to 
know more before proposing funding. Although 
this may be somewhat warranted, “knowing 
more” can only go so far in complex settings 
where much will remain out of the range of 
“knowability” until work begins. It might, there-
fore, help foundation strategists to think about 
the “Rumsfeld Principle” – to sort through their 
priorities for learning before and during strategy: 
There are known knowns. These are things that we 
know we know. There are known unknowns. That is 
to say there are things that we now know we don’t 
know. But there are also unknown unknowns. These 
are things we do not know we don’t know. (Rumsfeld, 
2002)
Much of the knowledge needed to support 
strategy can arise only during implementation. 
For example, how organizations react to each 
other’s new initiatives will surface only over 
time. Although some dynamics of change in 
a system might be “knowable” before strategy 
launch, much of what needs to be learned about 
these dynamics depends upon actual experience. 
One experience we know well surfaced in a case 
study of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s 
grantmaking “to improve care at the end of life.” 
Largely through their work with grantees, the 
foundation and their partner, Project on Death 
in America, came to understand that demand 
for palliative care was controlled by specialists 
(such as oncologists or neurologists) who were 
not inclined to give up on pursuing a “cure” for 
their patients; nor were most patients interested 
in a “good death.” Much learning took place 
through trial and error, in part through market 
research, before advocates and the foundations 
realized that there was a stalemate between those 
who perceived that care (palliation) could be a 
complement to cure and those who perceived 
that care would have to displace efforts to cure. 
The foundation learned from their experience and 
that of their grantees  that the stalemate might 
be broken if they could find ways to incorporate 
“care and cure,” by developing palliative-care 
specialists who could work by the side of those 
physicians most intent on cure (Patrizi & Patton, 
2010; Patrizi, Thompson, & Spector, 2008). 
Even when a foundation strategy is seen as 
relatively predictable, problems will arise. Suc-
cess often is contingent upon whole systems of 
organizations being able to work together differ-
ently and better to produce services in a timely 
and coordinated manner.  Invariably, things break 
down. People are unprepared, delivery systems 
don’t work, and anticipated funding from other 
sources evaporates. These problems require ongo-
ing discussion and consideration.
So too, foundations tend to overestimate their 
ability to command the attention and commit-
ment of others and underestimate competing 
claims on the same. Competition surfaces from 
newer initiatives, thereby affecting the capacity of 
foundations to hold the attention of their part-
ners.
And uncertainties multiply as interventions en-
gage "systems." Interdependencies emerge among 
and between many different component parts of 
change, frequently across organizational enti-
ties in order for the “whole” of the intervention 
to work. For instance, while “collective impact” 
efforts are designed to address interdependen-
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cies, participants need to commit to learn about 
and address one another’s inconsistencies and 
shortfalls such that they can make the “whole” 
work better. This takes time and commitment to 
learning.
These examples require strategic attention. But 
far from learning from implementation, formal 
attention to strategy tends to be organized around 
ways to track or monitor strategy according to 
measures reflected in the plan – that is, how it 
was articulated in the theory of change. 
Rather than learning as strategy unfolds, fidelity 
to the plan is emphasized when foundations ask: 
Did we do what we said we would do, did we meet 
our objectives, and did it result in the promised 
outcomes? Efforts to assure fidelity build on 
the assumption that the plan is correct and that 
the foundation’s job is to assure that it is imple-
mented accordingly. In this case the strategist is 
not seeking information that might lead to more 
fundamental adjustments to the strategy beyond 
alignment with the plan.  
Ignored are important questions, such as: Do we 
have what we need to do this work? Are parts of 
the change effort missing? Which strategy ele-
ments are getting traction, where, and why? What 
kind of resistance is encountered and why? How 
do emergent policies affect change? What are we 
learning about the kinds of capacities that are 
needed in order to execute strategy well? What 
are we learning about leverage assumptions? 
What levers actually move a system and how?
The failure to learn during strategy implementa-
tion is a serious problem. A large and well regard-
ed body of research, going back to the seminal 
studies of the War on Poverty programs, points 
to implementation issues as key, if not central, in 
program failure (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). 
What was learned then and what has emerged 
repeatedly in implementation studies is that 
strategy implementation is highly unpredictable 
– opposition emerges, allegiances change, and 
important elements of the context shift, some-
times dramatically. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, fidelity to the 
plan can seriously mislead decision makers either 
by attributing core strategy problems to poor im-
plementation or allowing a weak strategy, which 
goes according to plan, to proceed unchecked 
and therefore uncorrected. With the mindset of 
fidelity in place, even when a strategy is known to 
work, the strategist may fail to examine difficult 
and challenging conditions, alternatives, and, 
most important, how organizations and beneficia-
ries actually experience the work. It treats learn-
ing from strategy implementation as a relatively 
remote and inconsequential exercise.  
Strategy Trap 3: Indicator Blindness  
A centerpiece of strategic philanthropy is its focus 
on results. And results drive questions about how 
well a foundation performs against its desired 
outcomes. Indeed, Paul Brest, former president 
of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, has 
suggested the term “outcomes-oriented philan-
thropy,” which he defined as 
where donors seek to achieve clearly defined goals, 
where they and their grantees pursue evidence-based 
strategies for achieving those goals, and where both 
parties monitor progress toward outcomes and as-
Rather than learning as strategy 
unfolds, fidelity to the plan is 
emphasized when foundations ask: 
Did we do what we said we would 
do, did we meet our objectives, 
and did it result in the promised 
outcomes? Efforts to assure fidelity 
build on the assumption that 
the plan is correct and that the 
foundation’s job is to assure that it is 
implemented accordingly.
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sess their success in achieving them in order to make 
appropriate course corrections. (Brest, 2012, p. 42)
This perspective is not an isolated one; great 
interest has been generated by movements to-
ward managing to outcomes (Morino, 2011) and 
results-based accountability (Friedman, 2009).
Consequently, outcomes tracking and data collec-
tion have increased dramatically. Evaluation staff 
report that more resources are being applied to 
tracking strategy performance, with report cards 
and dashboards proliferating as the favored devic-
es, especially for reporting to boards (Center for 
Evaluation Innovation, 2013). These report cards 
are populated with indicators and their associated 
metrics. Indicators often emerge early in strategy 
development, usually attached to a nascent theory 
of change. Indicators tend to correspond to the 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes identified in the 
TOC document.
Whether this drive toward a range of perfor-
mance measurement and management approach-
es is appropriate for complex strategies warrants 
some serious consideration. A recent edition of 
New Directions for Evaluation, devoted to per-
formance management, identifies two conditions 
needed for effective use of indicators: “Perfor-
mance measurement ... works on the twin as-
sumptions that the operational theory of change 
is correct and will lead to intended outcomes, and 
that internally measured data are valid” (Hunter 
& Nielson, 2013, p. 9). For instance, we know that 
immunizations work. Since we know already that 
immunizations are effective, tracking the delivery 
of immunizations can provide valid informa-
tion about how the health system, in this case, 
performs.  
This kind of certainty, however, does not char-
acterize much of the work supported under the 
umbrella of strategic philanthropy. Whenever 
interventions focus on creating change in highly 
dynamic systems with unpredictable reactions 
and results, uncertainty exists on many levels: 
from whether the requisite human and organiza-
tional capacities are in place to launch the strat-
egy to how the surrounding market for services 
and products responds and affects the strategy in 
important ways.   
In light of all of these unknowns, when founda-
tions adopt performance indicators that reinforce 
the belief that the linear, causal, and often-
unchecked assumptions built into the strategy 
theory of change are certain, they fall into the 
“indicator blindness trap.” Rather than treating 
strategy elements as the tentative hypotheses that 
they likely are, foundation investment in tracking 
indicators can become far more deterministic of 
all that follows.  
Also, used poorly, indicators can misinform and 
misdirect subsequent actions and distract founda-
tions and grantees from asking and exploring 
more salient questions. For instance, it is rare for 
an indicator to provide insight into the degree 
to which core strategy assumptions hold up. In 
complex situations where causal links are unclear, 
tracking indicators as though “what gets done” is 
equivalent to achieving an outcome (such as the 
case with immunizations) is misleading – as what 
gets done might not work.  
However, indicators have an appropriate role in 
strategy. And some indicators are better than oth-
ers. Indicators provide basic information about 
“how much” of something exists, be it a condition, 
behavior, or characteristic. They can point to the 
amount of a problem, asset, or concern. As such, 
they can inform ballpark estimates of the size of 
a problem. Indicators can also help draw atten-
tion to issues of concern, drive good discussions 
among stakeholders, and point to the need for 
more thoughtful analyses.
For the most part, indicators need to be ap-
proached with great care and should not be used 
without thought about the behavior they will 
motivate. For instance, the goal of “hitting a quan-
titative target” historically has distorted behavior 
toward an emphasis on more rather than better. 
Many of the indicators foundations employ tend 
to consist of raw counts and are not based on 
knowledge of whether what is measured is predic-
tive of an outcome. Likewise, targets are set with-
out understanding the thresholds of performance 
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of any one indicator or the interaction among 
them, and data are often presented without the 
contextual or qualitative information that could 
help make their meaning more apparent.  
Nor do indicators provide answers to questions, 
as they offer little useful insight into how and why 
performance varies. Donald Campbell, a scholar 
of social experimentation, captures the core of the 
indicator trap in his advice to evaluators to treat 
indicators as questions rather than as answers 
(1977). Yet foundations’ adherence to indicators 
as a gauge of strategy performance reflects a level 
of certitude that ends up precluding both the ask-
ing and the answering of good questions. 
Results, of course, are important. However, when 
foundations push on “results” before they know 
whether what they fund actually works, they 
install a kind of compliance mentality that will 
likely undermine grantee capacity to adapt and 
respond appropriately. As the adage goes, what 
gets measured gets done – whether it produces 
results or not. So while results matter, when foun-
dations drive on measurement prematurely and 
without commensurate reflection, conversation, 
and adjustment based on learning, they are likely 
to derail learning and progress.
Advancing the Practice: Building Strategic 
Learning Capacities
The heart of the strategy formation process can 
be found in learning from tangible experience and 
visioning from creative insights. 
– Henry Mintzberg (2007)
This article presents a case and an approach to 
help foundations avoid the traps we have de-
scribed and to arrive at better ways to learn in 
complex and uncertain strategy situations. This 
shift toward learning will require foundations 
to make changes in how they think and act as 
strategists – in their mindset about what consti-
tutes strategy and learning, in the nature of the 
questions they ask and the kind of information 
they value, and ultimately in the processes they 
construct to reflect upon and improve strategy as 
it evolves. 
By adopting strategic learning many small things 
would change. For instance, theories of change 
would include hypotheses and assumptions. They 
would not predict with false precision how the 
change process and its impact will occur 10 or 
more years down the road, but instead would 
make predictions contingent on what is learned 
during implementation. Questions would focus 
on building understanding of “what is” rather 
than focusing on “whether what was planned was 
done.” Questions of “why,” “how,” and “for whom” 
would become at least as important as “what” or 
“how much.”
Larger and more fundamental changes are needed 
as well. Authoritative single perspectives would 
give way to more inclusive approaches. Areas of 
core uncertainty would become opportunities to 
build understanding and increase shared perspec-
tives. And recognition of real disagreements and 
conflict is allowed. Strategy is not seen as “one 
and done,” but as adaptive and evolving.   
Ultimately, this work must be supported by 
foundation leaders. Foundation executives must 
build the appetite among their board members to 
hear more of the substance behind the work that 
they fund and come to understand and accept 
the depth of their reliance upon their grantees to 
navigate uncertain terrain. Foundation executives 
and boards can contribute in important ways to 
the evolution and sophistication of the strategy by 
fostering the kind of useful debate that can chal-
lenge staff to grapple more with those who think 
differently. They can ask for and thereby encour-
age more discussion about what has not worked 
well just as much as what has. The cost for the 
board is likely to be perhaps more to read; on the 
other hand, the payoff is that all parties will know 
more and have more of a chance to form a deeper 
understanding of the complex work that the foun-
dation supports.
Shift the Mindset 
We appreciate that foundation boards and staff 
confront a broad spectrum of anxieties as they 
propose and engage in strategy: the inherent risks 
associated with funding uncertain strategies (Can 
we make a difference? What if it doesn’t work?); 
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the sufficiency of due diligence before making 
a funding decision (Did we learn everything we 
could to assure that this will work?); and early 
and ongoing concerns about progress (How will 
we know if our strategy is working?). Typically, 
foundations believe that the most important 
decisions are made at the outset because that is 
when the most risk is actually experienced. 
This is where indicators and report cards have 
played what we see as a largely symbolic role. 
Much of performance tracking and the indica-
tors used by foundations at the outset reinforce 
an illusion of manageability, control, and ac-
countability in complex circumstances. “To track 
a strategy” conveys the message that a funder 
knows what to do, how to do it, and can manage 
strategy performance to the desired outcomes. 
In essence, they serve as a symbol of strategy 
certainty and control. In reality, this sense of 
certainty and foundation control is fleeting and 
indicators provide inadequate guidance to those 
who need to make actual strategy decisions. 
Strategic learning requires foundations to make 
several changes in their approach to strategy: 
•	 These endeavors are, by definition, ongoing, 
long haul, and will necessarily evolve; there-
fore learning and strategy decisions need to be 
iterative.
•	 There is more that is unknown about a strategy 
than what is known, therefore better diagnosis 
and more informed capacity can be developed 
only by doing the work, thinking about it, and 
importing experience and knowledge into 
strategy decisions.
•	 Rote strategy tracking needs to give way to 
questions, reflection, and strategy adaptation. 
 
One of the most important changes that must 
accompany this work is for foundations to accept 
that knowledge will necessarily be incremental 
and imperfect.    
Table 1 provides a set of mindset flags to help 
foundations spot and discuss trap-like features 
of linearity, certainty, control, denial, etc., when 
they arise and to help identify alternative ways of 
thinking.
Ask Better Questions 
Framing good questions for strategy has often 
been challenging in the context of foundation 
strategy. One aspect of the problem stems from 
the narrow perspective that some foundations 
typically take toward their work, i.e., one-by-one 
grants and initiatives. Rather the strategy frame 
needs to be enlarged to include a greater focus 
on conditions and dynamics surrounding the 
strategy – i.e. the types of markets of profession-
als and organizations and other actors, such as 
political and regulatory, who drive or constrain 
strategy evolution. As noted, a major part of the 
problem has been that important assumptions 
about motivation for change, such as participa-
tion levels or how change will actually deepen  or 
expand, are rarely examined. Another part of the 
problem emerges from the way that questions 
asked by foundation boards – "Did we move the 
needle?” “Did we have an impact?” – deflect at-
tention from what actually occurs.   
Better questions emerge from real experience. As 
the palliative-care advocates learned during the 
implementation of their strategy, doing the work 
of strategy can make strategists keen enough 
to ask the right questions. Our experience as 
evaluators has given us the opportunity to work 
with excellent strategists and we have learned 
that they share a common feature – a reliance on 
“doing” as a way to make them smarter and more 
effective strategist and change agents. 
While there is no established method to iden-
tify the questions that may be most appropriate 
for any given strategy, Table 2 suggests a way to 
generate questions associated with a number of 
the underlying assumptions surrounding these 
strategies. This table is meant to provide a start-
ing point for reflection.
Mindset Advice for Evaluators
Identify	and	acknowledge	sources	of	uncertainty,	
including	inadequate	knowledge	about	how	to	
produce	desired	outcomes	[and]	disagreements	
among	key	actors	about	what	to	do,	including	
value	conflicts.	Nurture	tolerance	for	ambiguity.	
(Patton,	2011)
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Use a Disciplined Process to Support Strategic 
Learning
Sidestepping the strategy traps illustrated in this 
article requires more than just shifts in thinking 
and better questions. It requires a process of re-
flection and decision to support strategic learning 
and decision making. In this process, strategy is 
treated as the actual theory that it is rather than a 
blueprint for certain action. 
While there is no single way to approach this 
work, there are two major process features to 
consider for better strategic learning: 
1.  Engage a group of outsiders and insiders led 
by an external strategy facilitator. A range of 
important perspectives should be involved in 
the learning and adaptation process. Reflection 
requires input from both strategy insiders and 
outsiders. Participants in the strategy, as well as 
those affected by or influencing it, will have dif-
ferent views regarding the nature of the problem, 
the feasibility of different approaches, and how 
interventions are experienced over time. To be 
successful, social-change strategists need to 
incorporate better information and knowledge of 
the experience from a wider range of perspectives 
TABLE 1	Mindset	Flags	to	Avoid	Strategy	Trapsx
From: Certainty and 
Linear Tracking
Why the mindset is 
problematic
To: Recognizing Complexity 
and Strategic Learning
Simplified,	linear,	certain	plan. Distorts	complexity,	conceals	
dynamics	and	what	needs	to	be	
learned	during	implementation.
Articulate	and	test	assumptions,	
understand	the	present	through	
data	and	experience.
There	is	a	single	right	perspective	
and	approach.
Rarely	true,	and	never	perceived	
as	such;	can	be	foundation-
centric;	can	represent	
confirmation	bias.
Multiple	perspectives	and	courses	
of	action	are	possible;	keep	an	
eye	on	environmental	conditions	
that	affect	the	feasibility	of	your	
approach	or	the	desirability	of	
alternatives.
Plan	comprehensively	before	
doing.
Discounts	emergence:	Answering	
all	questions	up	front	assumes	a	
static	environment.
Evolve	strategy	by	learning	
from	doing.	Observe	shorter-
term	results.	Build	in	periodic	
strategy	updates	based	on	same.	
Examine	what	happens	as	a	
result	of	strategy	actions.	Pilot	
and	test.
Exclusive/dominant	focus	on	
philanthropic	action/strategy.
Overly	foundation-centric:	
Focuses	data	collection	on	
foundation	strategy	rather	
than	how	systems	respond	to	
interventions.
View	action	and	reaction	as	
part	of	a	whole;	treat	context	
as	though	it	matters.	Look	at	
variation	–	what	happens	under	
different	conditions.
Track	for	alignment. Over-commitment:	forces	
alignment	toward	what	might	be	
wrong.
Improvement	through	making	
sense	of	what	you	see	and	learn;	
align	when	it	makes	sense.
Measure	what	you	can. Often	not	“valid”	–	that	is,	not	
really	measuring	what	you	want	
it	to	measure	or	easy	but	not	
relevant;	focuses	on	counting	and	
calls	it	accountability.
Measure	what	matters:	look	at	
experience	–	analyze	data,	look	
for	variation,	interpret,	and	adapt.
Learning as Strategy
THE FoundationReview 2013 Vol 5:3 61
and positions from within the systems they seek 
to change. Also important is to be open to differ-
ent types of knowledge from both practice and 
formal research and from divergent opinions. 
Insiders (staff, key grantees) are susceptible to 
biases when examining information about their 
strategies. They tend to see their experiences as 
unique, and therefore discount potentially useful 
learning from analogous situations. 
TABLE 2 Sample	Strategy	Questions	to	Support	Learning	and	Adaptation 
Primary Assumption Areas Questions to Consider
Who is in or out of the strategy? (Meadows, 
2008; Ulrich, 2005; Westley, Zimmerman, & 
Patton, 2006)
The nature of motivation
Assumptions	about	strategy	being	so	compelling	
or	"right"	can	be	a	blinder	to	understanding	deeper	
sentiments,	resistance,	and	nature	of	competition	
for	attention.
Explore	motivations,	incentives,	and	areas	where	
actors	feel	control	exerted	over	them,	by	whom,	
why,	and	how:
What	are	the	historical	and	current	major	allegiances	
for	participants?	To	whom	do	they	feel	accountable?
What	are	the	real	or	perceived	costs	to	participation,	
including	opportunity	costs?
What	are	the	real	or	perceived	costs	to	participation,	
including	opportunity	costs?
Who benefits? (Attenborough, 2007; Schon, 
1973; Williams & Hummelbrunner, 2010)
The nature of “benefit” to whom and why
What	is	the	evidence	and	does	it	matter	and	to	
whom?	What	is	the	actual	experience?
Explore	how	the	"problem"	is	framed	and	underlying	
sentiments,	sources:
How	do	actors	articulate	the	problem?	In	what	ways	
does	it	vary?	Where,	how,	and	why	does	it	differ	
from	dominant	strategy	perspective?
Who	trusts	whom,	and	why?
Explore	actual	experience	of	beneficiaries	and	
constituents:
How	do	“outcomes”	vary?	Who	gains	and	who	
loses,	and	why?
Is leverage viable? (Hagel, Brown, & Davison, 
2010; Schon, 1983)
The nature of leverage and requirements for 
deployment
Many	assumptions	about	leverage	but	not	well	
understood;	important	arena	for	exploration.
Explore	and	question	what	leverage	is;	how	and	
when	it	works;	whether	it	works	now.	Explore	how	
the	surrounding	system	keeps	things	in	stasis;	
when,	where,	and	why	does	the	system	make	
change:	
Where	would	a	change	in	one	part	of	the	system	
ripple	through	other	parts?	
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Outsiders tend to be less biased and more 
capable of generalizing across situations and 
incorporating relevant data from previous deci-
sions (Bazerman & Moore, 2009). Outsiders can 
deliberately import different perspectives and 
bodies of research to help the group make sense 
of what they are learning and to surface potential 
adaptations that could be tried. Outsiders might 
include subject-matter experts with deep content 
knowledge in the area, researchers who bring 
data or evidence to bear about questions that 
emerge, and practitioners from other fields who 
have tried similar tactics or approaches.  
External facilitation to guide reflective practice 
and raise challenging questions will help the 
group explore variation in perspective and action 
that emerges from the strategy work. The facilita-
tor can play devil’s advocate, push against 
confirmatory bias, and examine what doesn’t 
work as well as what does work (and for whom, 
how, and why). 
This is meant to be a pragmatic process designed 
for productive participation – not every poten-
tial person or group involved with the strategy 
should participate in these deliberations. Broader 
input and feedback can be incorporated through 
focus groups, alternate planning processes, 
surveys, and other methods. This process can be 
put into place experimentally – that is, through 
piloting work with select strategies – while the 
board, staff, and grantees come to understand 
what learning might mean for them.  
2. Commit to the process as ongoing and iterative 
to support ongoing strategy adaptation. To be 
adaptive, strategy under conditions of complexity 
is iterative. There is no one-point-in-time process 
that can suffice. Although there are no hard and 
fast rules about how often strategy-related data 
and potential adaptations should be considered, 
in light of the level of uncertainty in complex set-
tings, reflection needs to occur more frequently 
than at the beginning, midpoint, and end of a 
strategy; we suggest convening the group every 
six months. This frequency of convening should 
represent a period during which enough work 
would have taken place to warrant questioning 
and reflection, but not so long that the window of 
opportunity to make decisions and adjustments 
is lost. 
By engaging in such a process, a foundation 
makes a serious commitment to ask and ad-
dress difficult questions. It requires dedication 
and resources to gather information, collect and 
analyze data, and – perhaps most important – to 
reflect on what is learned in order to modify and 
improve strategy. The strategy facilitator surfaces 
questions as the strategy evolves and helps the 
group commit to productive information gather-
ing of various kinds – from evaluators, research-
ers, or reconnaissance by members of the group. 
Older and newer approaches such as develop-
mental evaluation (Patton, 2011) and reflective 
practice (Schon, 1983; Argyris, 1982, 1993) can 
provide advice and guidance for those assuming 
this role. 
The Value and Discipline of Strategic 
Learning 
Taking complexity seriously means that learning 
be built on cycles of acting, sense making, and 
drawing implications for action – as action is 
the essence of strategy.  Strategic learning is not 
something to be done about strategy, but rather is 
the core of strategy.  
To be successful, social-change 
strategists need to incorporate better 
information and knowledge of the 
experience from a wider range of 
perspectives and positions from 
within the systems they seek to 
change. Also important is to be open 
to different types of knowledge from 
both practice and formal research 
and from divergent opinions.
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We challenge foundations to exercise their 
strategic role by recognizing and accepting that 
uncertainty exists; to use their freedom and flex-
ibility to act, learn, fail, and do better; and to go 
beyond their reliance on overly simplistic indica-
tors. Paramount to this is the realization that 
deep understanding of complex strategic work 
can only emerge through action, reflection, and 
more action (Schon, 1983; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, 
& Lampel, 1998; Mintzberg, 2007).
While we recognize that foundations operate 
under constraints, few other entities have the 
purview, freedom, or position to learn as well. 
Foundations have the resources to support 
information.  And they have the freedom to try 
and err. 
Learning as strategy is not a trivial or occasional 
exercise. It must be a deliberate process, as 
decisions will depend on it. So too, it requires 
commitment, time, resources, and the support 
of leadership. Foundation leaders must support 
the function and work to build board appetite 
for more complex discussions that adequately 
reflects the nature of the work.
Ultimately, the value of strategic learning will be 
found in the quality of thinking, decisions, and 
improvements to strategy that emerge. While 
not a guarantee of certain success – complexity 
at best ensures uncertainty – this type of process 
offers the promise of more attuned action, more 
timely innovation, greater understanding of the 
implementation challenges, and better awareness 
of and response to the context surrounding the 
strategic endeavor.
As Henry Mintzberg, a corporate strategist and 
one of the most influential thinkers in the corpo-
rate world, has argued, and we have attempted 
to demonstrate here, it is only through learning 
from action that a truly powerful strategy – one 
with the potential to foster change and better 
outcomes – can emerge and take hold. 
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